Two sets of the same order type have the same cardinality. The converse is not true in general for infinite sets: it is possible to impose different well-orderings on the set of natural numbers that give rise to different ordinal numbers.

There is a natural ordering on the ordinals, which is itself a well-ordering. Given any ordinal α, one can consider the set of all ordinals less than α. This set turns out to have ordinal number α. This observation is used for a different way of introducing the ordinals, in which an ordinal is equated with the set of all smaller ordinals. This form of ordinal number is thus a canonical representative of the earlier form of equivalence class.

See Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel for more on paradoxes of enumeration.

This demonstrates that the "size" of sets as defined by cardinality alone is not the only useful way of comparing sets. Measure theory provides a more nuanced theory of size that conforms to our intuition that length and area are incompatible measures of size.

In set theory, an infinite set is not considered to be created by some mathematical process such as "adding one element" that is then carried out "an infinite number of times". Instead, a particular infinite set (such as the set of all natural numbers) is said to already exist, "by fiat", as an assumption or an axiom. Given this infinite set, other infinite sets are then proven to exist as well, as a logical consequence. But it is still a natural philosophical question to contemplate some physical action that actually completes after an infinite number of discrete steps; and the interpretation of this question using set theory gives rise to the paradoxes of the supertask.

The paradox is further increased by the significance of the removal sequence. If the balls are not removed in the sequence 1, 2, 3, ... but in the sequence 1, 11, 21, ... after one hour infinitely many balls populate the reservoir, although the same amount of material as before has been moved.

In 1897 the Italian mathematician Cesare Burali-Forti discovered that there is no set containing all ordinal numbers. As every ordinal number is defined by a set of smaller ordinal numbers, the well-ordered set Ω of all ordinal numbers (if it exists) fits the definition and is itself an ordinal. On the other hand, no ordinal number can contain itself, so Ω cannot be an ordinal. Therefore, the set of all ordinal numbers cannot exist.

There are close similarities between Russell's paradox in set theory and the Grelling–Nelson paradox, which demonstrates a paradox in natural language.

As with König's paradox, this paradox cannot be formalized in axiomatic set theory because it requires the ability to tell whether a description applies to a particular set (or, equivalently, to tell whether a formula is actually the definition of a single set).