# New Foundations

In mathematical logic, **New Foundations** (**NF**) is an axiomatic set theory, conceived by Willard Van Orman Quine as a simplification of the theory of types of *Principia Mathematica*. Quine first proposed NF in a 1937 article titled "**New Foundations for Mathematical Logic**"; hence the name. Much of this entry discusses **NFU**, an important variant of NF due to Jensen (1969) and exposited in Holmes (1998).^{[1]} In 1940 and in a revision of 1951, Quine introduced an extension of NF sometimes called "Mathematical Logic" or "ML", that included proper classes as well as sets.

New Foundations has a universal set, so it is a non-well-founded set theory.^{[2]} That is to say, it is an axiomatic set theory that allows infinite descending chains of membership such as
… x_{n} ∈ x_{n-1} ∈ … ∈ x_{2} ∈ x_{1}. It avoids Russell's paradox by permitting only stratifiable formulas to be defined using the axiom schema of comprehension. For instance x ∈ y is a stratifiable formula, but x ∈ x is not.

This type theory is much less complicated than the one first set out in the *Principia Mathematica*, which included types for relations whose arguments were not necessarily all of the same type. In 1914, Norbert Wiener showed how to code the ordered pair as a set of sets, making it possible to eliminate relation types in favor of the linear hierarchy of sets described here.

The well-formed formulas of New Foundations (NF) are the same as the well-formed formulas of TST, but with the type annotations erased. The axioms of NF are:

Even the indirect reference to types implicit in the notion of stratification can be eliminated. Theodore Hailperin showed in 1944 that *Comprehension* is equivalent to a finite conjunction of its instances,^{[3]} so that NF can be finitely axiomatized without any reference to the notion of type.

Relations and functions are defined in TST (and in NF and NFU) as sets of ordered pairs in the usual way. The usual definition of the ordered pair, first proposed by Kuratowski in 1921, has a serious drawback for NF and related theories: the resulting ordered pair necessarily has a type two higher than the type of its arguments (its left and right projections). Hence for purposes of determining stratification, a function is three types higher than the members of its field.

If one can define a pair in such a way that its type is the same type as that of its arguments (resulting in a **type-level** ordered pair), then a relation or function is merely one type higher than the type of the members of its field. Hence NF and related theories usually employ Quine's set-theoretic definition of the ordered pair, which yields a type-level ordered pair. Holmes (1998) takes the ordered pair and its left and right projections as primitive. Fortunately, whether the ordered pair is type-level by definition or by assumption (i.e., taken as primitive) usually does not matter.

The existence of a type-level ordered pair implies *Infinity*, and NFU + *Infinity* interprets NFU + "there is a type level ordered pair" (they are not quite the same theory, but the differences are inessential). Conversely, NFU + *Infinity* + *Choice* proves the existence of a type-level ordered pair.^{[citation needed]}

NF (and NFU + *Infinity* + *Choice*, described below and known consistent) allow the construction of two kinds of sets that ZFC and its proper extensions disallow because they are "too large" (some set theories admit these entities under the heading of proper classes):

The category whose objects are the sets of NF and whose arrows are the functions between those sets is not Cartesian closed;^{[6]} Cartesian closure can be a useful property for a category of sets. Since NF lacks Cartesian closure, not every function curries as one might intuitively expect, and NF is not a topos.

For many years, the outstanding problem with NF has been that it has not conclusively been proved to be relatively consistent to any other well-known axiomatic system in which arithmetic can be modelled. NF disproves Choice, and thus proves Infinity (Specker, 1953). But it is also known (Jensen, 1969) that allowing urelements (multiple distinct objects lacking members) yields NFU, a theory that is consistent relative to Peano arithmetic; if Infinity and Choice are added, the resulting theory has the same consistency strength as type theory with infinity or bounded Zermelo set theory. (NFU corresponds to a type theory TSTU, where type 0 has urelements, not just a single empty set.) There are other relatively consistent variants of NF.

NFU is, roughly speaking, weaker than NF because in NF, the power set of the universe is the universe itself, while in NFU, the power set of the universe may be strictly smaller than the universe (the power set of the universe contains only sets, while the universe may contain urelements). In fact, this is necessarily the case in NFU+"Choice".

In 1983, Marcel Crabbé proved consistent a system he called NFI, whose axioms are unrestricted extensionality and those instances of *Comprehension* in which no variable is assigned a type higher than that of the set asserted to exist. This is a predicativity restriction, though NFI is not a predicative theory: it admits enough impredicativity to define the set of natural numbers (defined as the intersection of all inductive sets; note that the inductive sets quantified over are of the same type as the set of natural numbers being defined). Crabbé also discussed a subtheory of NFI, in which only parameters (free variables) are allowed to have the type of the set asserted to exist by an instance of *Comprehension*. He called the result "predicative NF" (NFP); it is, of course, doubtful whether any theory with a self-membered universe is truly predicative. Holmes has ^{[date missing]} shown that NFP has the same consistency strength as the predicative theory of types of *Principia Mathematica* without the Axiom of reducibility.

Since 2015, several candidate proofs by Randall Holmes of the consistency of NF relative to ZF have been available both on arxiv and on the logician's home page. Holmes demonstrates the equiconsistency of a 'weird' variant of TST, namely TTT_{λ} - 'tangled type theory with λ-types' - with NF. Holmes next shows that TTT_{λ} is consistent relative to ZFA, that is, ZF with atoms but without choice. Holmes demonstrates this by constructing in ZFA+C, that is, ZF with atoms and choice, a class model of ZFA which includes 'tangled webs of cardinals' . The candidate proofs are all rather long, but no irrecoverable faults have been identified by the NF community as yet.

NF steers clear of the three well-known paradoxes of set theory. That NFU, a consistent (relative to Peano arithmetic) theory, also avoids the paradoxes may increase one's confidence in this fact.

One might assert that this result shows that no model of NF(U) is "standard", since the ordinals in any model of NFU are externally not well-ordered. One need not take a position on this, but can note that it is also a theorem of NFU that any set model of NFU has non-well-ordered "ordinals"; NFU does not conclude that the universe *V* is a model of NFU, despite *V* being a set, because the membership relation is not a set relation.

For a further development of mathematics in NFU, with a comparison to the development of the same in ZFC, see implementation of mathematics in set theory.

ML is an extension of NF that includes proper classes as well as sets.
The set theory of the 1940 first edition of Quine's *Mathematical Logic* married NF to the proper classes of NBG set theory, and included an axiom schema of unrestricted comprehension for proper classes. However J. Barkley Rosser (1942) proved that the system presented in *Mathematical Logic* was subject to the Burali-Forti paradox. This result does not apply to NF. Hao Wang (1950) showed how to amend Quine's axioms for ML so as to avoid this problem, and Quine included the resulting axiomatization in the 1951 second and final edition of *Mathematical Logic*.

Wang proved that if NF is consistent then so is the revised ML, and also showed that the consistency of the revised ML implies the consistency of NF. That is, NF and the revised ML are equiconsistent.

The automorphism *j* of a model of this kind is closely related to certain natural operations in NFU. For example, if *W* is a well-ordering in the nonstandard model (we suppose here that we use Kuratowski pairs so that the coding of functions in the two theories will agree to some extent) which is also a well-ordering in NFU (all well-orderings of NFU are well-orderings in the nonstandard model of Zermelo set theory, but not vice versa, due to the formation of urelements in the construction of the model), and *W* has type α in NFU, then *j*(*W*) will be a well-ordering of type *T*(α) in NFU.

In this section, the effect is considered of adding various "strong axioms of infinity" to our usual base theory, NFU + *Infinity* + *Choice*. This base theory, known consistent, has the same strength as TST + *Infinity*, or Zermelo set theory with *Separation* restricted to bounded formulas (Mac Lane set theory).

One can add to this base theory strong axioms of infinity familiar from the ZFC context, such as "there exists an inaccessible cardinal," but it is more natural to consider assertions about Cantorian and strongly Cantorian sets. Such assertions not only bring into being large cardinals of the usual sorts, but strengthen the theory on its own terms.

*Counting* implies *Infinity*; each of the axioms below needs to be adjoined to NFU + *Infinity* to get the effect of strong variants of *Infinity*; Ali Enayat has investigated the strength of some of these axioms in models of NFU + "the universe is finite".

A model of the kind constructed above satisfies *Counting* just in case the automorphism *j* fixes all natural numbers in the underlying nonstandard model of Zermelo set theory.

Immediate consequences include Mathematical Induction for unstratified conditions (which is not a consequence of *Counting*; many but not all unstratified instances of induction on the natural numbers follow from *Counting*).

This axiom holds in a model of the kind constructed above (with *Choice*) if the ordinals which are fixed by *j* and dominate only ordinals fixed by *j* in the underlying nonstandard model of Zermelo set theory are standard, and the power set of any such ordinal in the model is also standard. This condition is sufficient but not necessary.

This very simple and appealing assertion is extremely strong. Solovay has shown the precise equivalence of the consistency strength of the theory NFUA = NFU + *Infinity* + *Cantorian Sets* with that of ZFC + a schema asserting the existence of an *n*-Mahlo cardinal for each concrete natural number *n*. Ali Enayat has shown that the theory of Cantorian equivalence classes of well-founded extensional relations (which gives a natural picture of an initial segment of the cumulative hierarchy of ZFC) interprets the extension of ZFC with *n*-Mahlo cardinals directly. A permutation technique can be applied to a model of this theory to give a model in which the hereditarily strongly Cantorian sets with the usual membership relation model the strong extension of ZFC.

This axiom holds in a model of the kind constructed above (with *Choice*) just in case the ordinals fixed by *j* in the underlying nonstandard model of ZFC are an initial (proper class) segment of the ordinals of the model.

This combines the effect of the two preceding axioms and is actually even stronger (precisely how is not known). Unstratified mathematical induction enables proving that there are *n*-Mahlo cardinals for every *n*, given *Cantorian Sets*, which gives an extension of ZFC that is even stronger than the previous one, which only asserts that there are *n*-Mahlos for each concrete natural number (leaving open the possibility of nonstandard counterexamples).

This axiom will hold in a model of the kind described above if every ordinal fixed by *j* is standard, and every power set of an ordinal fixed by *j* is also standard in the underlying model of ZFC. Again, this condition is sufficient but not necessary.

An ordinal is said to be *Cantorian* if it is fixed by *T*, and *strongly Cantorian* if it dominates only Cantorian ordinals (this implies that it is itself Cantorian). In models of the kind constructed above, Cantorian ordinals of NFU correspond to ordinals fixed by *j* (they are not the same objects because different definitions of ordinal numbers are used in the two theories).

Solovay has shown the precise equivalence in consistency strength of NFUB = NFU + *Infinity* + *Cantorian Sets* + *Small Ordinals* with Morse–Kelley set theory plus the assertion that the proper class ordinal (the class of all ordinals) is a weakly compact cardinal. This is very strong indeed! Moreover, NFUB-, which is NFUB with *Cantorian Sets* omitted, is easily seen to have the same strength as NFUB.

A model of the kind constructed above will satisfy this axiom if every collection of ordinals fixed by *j* is the intersection of some set of ordinals with the ordinals fixed by *j*, in the underlying nonstandard model of ZFC.

Even stronger is the theory NFUM = NFU + *Infinity* + *Large Ordinals* + *Small Ordinals*. This is equivalent to Morse–Kelley set theory with a predicate on the classes which is a κ-complete nonprincipal ultrafilter on the proper class ordinal κ; in effect, this is Morse–Kelley set theory + "the proper class ordinal is a measurable cardinal"!

The technical details here are not the main point, which is that reasonable and natural (in the context of NFU) assertions turn out to be equivalent in power to very strong axioms of infinity in the ZFC context. This fact is related to the correlation between the existence of models of NFU, described above and satisfying these axioms, and the existence of models of ZFC with automorphisms having special properties.