The beginnings of the Curry–Howard correspondence lie in several observations:
In other words, the Curry–Howard correspondence is the observation that two families of seemingly unrelated formalisms—namely, the proof systems on one hand, and the models of computation on the other—are in fact the same kind of mathematical objects.a proof is a program, and the formula it proves is the type for the program
Speculatively, the Curry–Howard correspondence might be expected to lead to a substantial unification between mathematical logic and foundational computer science:
At the level of formulas and types, the correspondence says that implication behaves the same as a function type, conjunction as a "product" type (this may be called a tuple, a struct, a list, or some other term depending on the language), disjunction as a sum type (this type may be called a union), the false formula as the empty type and the true formula as the singleton type (whose sole member is the null object). Quantifiers correspond to dependent function space or products (as appropriate). This is summarized in the following table:
Between the natural deduction system and the lambda calculus there are the following correspondences:
If one restricts to the implicational intuitionistic fragment, a simple way to formalize logic in Hilbert's style is as follows. Let Γ be a finite collection of formulas, considered as hypotheses. Then δ is derivable from Γ, denoted Γ ⊢ δ, in the following cases:
This can be formalized using inference rules, as in the left column of the following table.
Typed combinatory logic can be formulated using a similar syntax: let Γ be a finite collection of variables, annotated with their types. A term T (also annotated with its type) will depend on these variables [Γ ⊢ T:δ] when:
Thanks to the correspondence, results from combinatory logic can be transferred to Hilbert-style logic and vice versa. For instance, the notion of reduction of terms in combinatory logic can be transferred to Hilbert-style logic and it provides a way to canonically transform proofs into other proofs of the same statement. One can also transfer the notion of normal terms to a notion of normal proofs, expressing that the hypotheses of the axioms never need to be all detached (since otherwise a simplification can happen).
Conversely, the non provability in intuitionistic logic of Peirce's law can be transferred back to combinatory logic: there is no typed term of combinatory logic that is typable with type
Sequent calculus is characterized by the presence of left introduction rules, right introduction rule and a cut rule that can be eliminated. The structure of sequent calculus relates to a calculus whose structure is close to the one of some abstract machines. The informal correspondence is as follows:
Thanks to the Curry–Howard correspondence, a typed expression whose type corresponds to a logical formula is analogous to a proof of that formula. Here are examples.
Since the antecedent here is just S, the consequent can be detached using Modus Ponens:
This is the same as the antecedent of the prior formula so, detaching the consequent:
a:β → α, b:γ → β, g:γ ⊢ b : γ → β a:β → α, b:γ → β, g:γ ⊢ g : γ ——————————————————————————————————— ———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— a:β → α, b:γ → β, g:γ ⊢ a : β → α a:β → α, b:γ → β, g:γ ⊢ b g : β ———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————— a:β → α, b:γ → β, g:γ ⊢ a (b g) : α ———————————————————————————————————— a:β → α, b:γ → β ⊢ λ g. a (b g) : γ → α ———————————————————————————————————————— a:β → α ⊢ λ b. λ g. a (b g) : (γ → β) -> γ → α ———————————————————————————————————— ⊢ λ a. λ b. λ g. a (b g) : (β → α) -> (γ → β) -> γ → α